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Introduction
Fans, coaches, and players often complain that referees make decisions based on fac-
tors other than what occurred on the playing surface. Although support for match fix-
ing is scant, spectators frequently accuse officials of bias against their team. In reality,
the bias usually rests with the irate fans or participants, while referees are loath to dis-
cuss the matter. However, anecdotal evidence from referees suggests that they are
aware of how games are being called and work to balance infractions. Adding to the
debate on make-up calls is former NHL senior referee, Kerry Fraser, who stated in
2011, 
When a referee realizes he made a call in error, the most difficult thing to overcome
is “human nature”—the natural tendency to attempt to fix it or make it right with an
even-up call. The referee wants to be fair and recognizes something he did just wasn’t
fair.
Fraser went on to say, “It occurs in all jobs and all walks of life. It can be enhanced
when under pressure.” 
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Abstract
This paper builds an economic model of referee behavior in the National Hockey
League using period-specific, in-game data. Recognizing that referees are influenced
by a desire for perceived fairness, this model isolates situations where a referee is more
likely to call a penalty on one team. While prior research has focused on a systematic
bias in favor of the home team, we find that referee bias also depends upon game-spe-
cific conditions that incentivize an evening of penalty calls. Refereeing games in this
fashion maintains the integrity of the game, thus benefiting spectator perceptions and
opportunities for financial returns.
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Combined with fan reactions, these quotes suggest the possibility of temporary bias
existing in the officiating of a sporting game. As the individuals charged with enforc-
ing the rules of the game and policing player behaviors, referees are in place as an
impartial party to maintain order and ensure a safe, fair outcome. However, officials
are also faced with numerous pressures of their own including from spectators in the
building (Boyko, Boyko, & Boyko, 2007; Buraimo, Forrest, & Simmons, 2009;
Moskowitz & Wertheim, 2011; Nevil, Balmer, & Williams, 2002; Scoppa, 2008; Sutter
& Kochera, 2004), from their peers, and from the league offices that determine their
employment. Significant financial ramifications also ride on perceptions of a fairly
called game. Balancing these pressures and maintaining strong working relationships
with each group is a high wire act, delicately walked by referees each game. Given these
expectations, how do referees maintain the integrity of the game while balancing
numerous influences? Also, when would a referee be most likely to exhibit temporary
bias to further the broader goal of the integrity of the match? 
Although several scholars have explored officiating bias under different conditions
(Boyko et al., 2007; Moskowitz & Wertheim, 2011; Mongeon & Mittelhammer, 2011),
few studies have considered that biases may change throughout the course of a game.
By looking at games and seasons in their totality, previous research has assumed that
biases are consistent throughout an entire contest. Further, this assumption fails to
allow for variation in referee behavior based on game conditions or other situational
factors. These assumptions have led researchers to conclude that home or popular
teams are always more likely to receive a favorable call from an official (Moskowitz &
Wertheim, 2011; Price, Remer, & Stone, 2012). However, this paper highlights how ref-
erees subconsciously shift their bias as the game progresses based on the flow of the
game. The model developed here illustrates when referees have incentives to call penal-
ties on each team. By using a sample of National Hockey League (NHL) data, this
research answers the questions of when referees allow for “make-up” calls within a
game.
The paper starts by reviewing background information on the National Hockey
League (NHL) and the role of referees. Second, areas where “biased impartiality” may
occur within the sport of hockey are examined, followed by a review of literature on
player actions. A description of the sample used in this study follows, along with our
analysis. This paper concludes with a discussion of the results, limitations of our work,
and avenues for future research.
Background
The National Hockey League 
Based on revenues, the National Hockey League is the fourth largest professional
sporting league in North America. The NHL consists of 30 teams with 23 located in
the United States and 7 in Canada. Revenues for the 2012 season are estimated at $3.2
billion, representing a 50% increase over the past 7 years (Staples, 2012). As with most
other professional sport leagues, a disproportionate share of these revenues are earned
in the postseason (Leeds & von Allmen, 2004; Robst, VanGilder, Berri, & Vance, 2011).
However, differing from the NFL, NBA, and MLB, the NHL’s primary source of rev-
enue is ticket sales. The variability of this revenue stream creates greater incentives for
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the NHL to create close games, perhaps even favoring home teams, with high levels of
outcome uncertainty across games and seasons (Coates & Humphreys, 2012; Fort,
2011; Staudohar, 2005). In playoff games, these incentives are enhanced due to a larg-
er audience following through numerous media outlets.
The primary responsibility of hockey officials (two referees and two linesmen) is to
monitor the play of the teams, watching for violations and penalties as a way of pro-
viding legitimacy to the contest. The referees are the only ones charged with calling
penalties, though they can consult with the linesmen when necessary. Violations, such
as offsides or icing, are mostly clear cut with little judgment necessary to determine
where the puck was in relation to an offensive player. However, there is significant dis-
cretion in awarding penalties given the rule book’s latitude in defining undesirable
behavior. Typical penalties include stick violations of slashing, hooking, or high-stick-
ing, as well as physical infringements such as boarding, roughing, interference, elbow-
ing, and fighting. Additionally, teams are assessed a penalty for having too many
players on the ice and delaying the game, though these are easier to identify and called
with near uniformity. When a penalty is called, the offending team loses a player on
the ice for the shorter of 2 minutes or until the other team scores. More severe penal-
ties can be 5 minutes or disqualification from the game. Losing a player is a significant
disadvantage. In the 2011-12 season, teams scored on 17.0% of their opportunities
with an extra skater, and 20.9% of all goals were scored via a power play
(www.nhl.com). In a game where winning teams typically score between three and
four goals, penalties can play a significant role in determining the outcome.
In an attempt to call a fair game, referees may possess an unconscious bias towards
evening up penalty calls. Subconsciously influenced by a desire to avoid directly favor-
ing one team, officials may also inadvertently demonstrate bias by ignoring borderline
acts that could be deemed in violation of a rule. This slight shift in standard occurs due
to the degree of interpretation in the role and is not indicative of illicit actions from a
referee.
The practice of evening up calls can have both positive and negative impacts on the
game. One clear advantage for spectators is the likelihood of a close, competitive game.
Exciting, unpredictable finishes make for good television and entertainment. However,
the negative impacts of evening up calls outweigh the positive benefits. When viola-
tions are ignored or inconsistently called, participants struggle to regulate their actions
to the desired behaviors. As a result, greater incentives exist for retaliation and danger-
ous play. Additionally, inconsistent officiating has the potential to undermine the pub-
lic’s confidence in the fairness of the game and the independence of the referees. 
Other models of referee behavior
Although there may be many reasons for home advantage (Koyama & Reade, 2008),
recent academic work has identified officials’ behavior as an explanation for the
greater success of home teams (Boyko et al, 2007; Pettersson-Lidbom & Priks, 2009;
Leard & Doyle, 2010). Appealing to an implicit desire to appease the partisan crowd
leads to a bias in the distribution of calls favoring the home team. Impacts of this
behavior are illustrated in the effect of crowd noise (Nevill, Balmer, & Williams, 2002),
added time in soccer matches (Sutter & Kochera, 2004) and games played in empty
stadia (Pettersson-Lidbom & Priks, 2009). These studies have found favoritism effects
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for an aggregate group of officials, as well as individual referees. Other scholars link
biases and behaviors of referees in response to crowd behaviors (Scoppa, 2008;
Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, & Prendergast, 2005; Nevill et al, 2002; Boyko et al, 2006).
Buraimo et al. (2009) represents an exception within the literature to the assumption
of consistent biases favoring the home team, finding evidence instead of make-up calls
in European football leagues. Ultimately, home teams win approximately 55% of
games, a difference of 5% from the expected mean of 50% if all games were played at
a neutral site. This bias has been connected to favorable home team calls and is con-
sistent across numerous sports, including baseball, football, basketball, hockey, soccer,
and the Olympic Games (Moskowitz & Wertheim, 2011; Nevill et al., 2002). 
Models of player behavior
Penalty and goal outcomes depend upon both referee and player behaviors. Numerous
studies have been conducted to assess the impact of player aggression on the outcome
of games (Buraimo et al., 2009; Jewell, 2009; Widmeyer & Birch, 1984; Widmeyer &
McGuire, 1997). In each instance, as in our model, aggression is viewed as actions
beyond the boundary of ordinarily accepted activities required in the sport and is pun-
ished through the incursion of a penalty or foul.
As a context for understanding aggression and officiating, European soccer has been
used to explain how referees manage yellow and red cards issued for aggressive fouls
(Buraimo et al., 2009). Beyond the referee bias towards home teams found in several
similar studies, players modify their behavior and become more aggressive when
behind in a match (Buraimo et al., 2009). Aggressive actions by players may be the
result of a tactical shift or frustration in how the game has progressed. Players may be
more likely to commit a foul when the game is likely to be lost and the opportunity
cost of disqualification is low (Jewell, 2009). However, when referees are added, hock-
ey players are not deterred from committing penalties but more penalties are observed
due to greater enforcement efforts (Heckelman & Yates, 2003). The combination of
these studies suggests that players’ actions are consistent with the team’s strategy and
have little variance in relation to referee behaviors.
Aggression is also studied as a strategy to increase the likelihood of success. Through
an examination of hockey results, Widmeyer and Birch (1984) examine the impact of
first period penalties on future performance. Although counterintuitive, committing
penalties in the beginning of a game may help increase the chances of a victory
through intimidation of the opponent (Widmeyer & Birch, 1984). Aggression may be
more prevalent with familiarity of the opponent as penalties increase between fre-
quent rivals seeking to carry the intimidation advantage over to multiple games
(Widmeyer & McGuire, 1997).
Building on prior frameworks of referee bias and player aggression, our paper con-
tinues in pursuit of referee tendencies to balance penalty calls. Whereas prior research
has sought a bias towards specific teams (Price et al., 2012), we model the behavior of
referees with each team treated equally in search of a balance of penalty calls. The fol-
lowing section outlines how data was collected to answer these questions. The paper
continues by displaying the results and discussing the conclusions drawn based on the
incentives of hockey referees.
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Theory and Calculation
The nature of hockey officiating creates a desirable laboratory for examining referee
behavior. In a given game, hockey referees assign an average of fewer than 10 total
penalties. This number is lower than other sports, as basketball referees may assign 25-
30 fouls per game and football officials spot 12-15 violations. The greater ease of track-
ing referee behavior, combined with the greater ability to affect the outcome (due to
the severity of the punishment and the closeness of games), provides a strong data set
for empirically testing the referee’s issuance of penalties.
Our interest lies in measuring NHL referee behavior in both playoff and regular sea-
son games. To account for the disproportionate amount of revenue earned by the NHL
in the playoffs (Leeds & von Allmen, 2004; Robst et al., 2011), the sample includes all
playoff games from 2006 - 2012 (n=599) and a randomly selected group of regular sea-
son games (n=450) from the same seasons. The websites www.nhl.com and
www.espn.com were used for data collection.
Of primary interest is the number of power-play creating penalties per period. A
period based analysis of penalty counts is selected for three reasons. First, we are con-
cerned with the balancing of all penalty calls, including those warranted and those that
may be questionable. Perceptions of fairness move beyond debatable calls that go each
way, and referees recognize that the totality of the game must be managed sufficiently,
not in constant response to a mistaken call. Second, with two intermissions, officials
have two opportunities to reflect upon how the game has progressed. While this may
not necessarily dictate how referees call games, the breaks provide for analysis over a
larger period of time than the previous play-by-play data. Penalties are awarded as the
play dictates and referees are likely to be unable and unwilling to alternate power play
opportunities. Finally, penalty calls need not be evened up with the same type of
penalty. While other studies of aggression measure the type of foul committed, balanc-
ing penalty calls need not match a slashing call with a similar slash by an opponent. In
collecting data, matching minors or matching fighting penalties are excluded as these
do not give one side an advantage and frequently involve lower degrees of judgment.
Our hypothesis is that teams with more penalties called on them early in the game
will receive fewer penalties later in the game, both in terms of expected penalties com-
pared to the opposition and the frequency of playing future periods with more penal-
ties. The dependent variables for our analysis are second and third period penalty
counts, for each model respectively. 
Each model uses a unique set of independent variables. For modeling second peri-
od outcomes, information on penalties and score at the conclusion of the first period
was used. This includes a variable for absolute goal differential (Tied, 1 goal, 2 goals,
3+ goals), if the team is ahead (Yes/No), and the teams’ penalty differential entering
the period. For modeling third period data, we use score and penalty statistics from the
end of the second period. Postseason fixed effects also include indicators for the 7th
game of a series (Yes/No) or if the game was played in the Stanley Cup Finals (Yes/No).
For regular season models, a binary variable for attendance (High/Low) is determined
by the arena drawing at least 95% of its capacity for a particular game. This variable is
excluded from the playoff models due to all playoff games being sold out. Additional
fixed effects are included for team and opponent in both populations to adjust for the
tendency of certain teams to give or receive higher or lower penalty counts. Each
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model is fit on the penalty data from all teams, and, as in Buraimo et al. (2009), fits are
also estimated separately for home and away teams.
Penalties and score are recorded and tracked by period for the home and road team,
and an indicator for referee pairing is included. We compare mean penalties per peri-
od given location, goal differential, and penalty differential at the start of the period.
Goal differential is defined as the difference in the number of goals each team had
scored when the period began. A team’s penalty differential is defined as the difference
between the number of power-play inducing penalties previously called on that team
and their opponent. For example, a second-period penalty differential of three indi-
cates that a team was called for three more penalties than the opposition in first peri-
od. Also, the frequency of finishing the second and third periods with higher penalties,
given previous penalty differentials, is calculated.
While previous work on penalties per period is scarce, Alan Ryder (2004) suggested
hockey outcomes can be approximated by a Poisson distribution. A count variable falls
under the Poisson distribution if the observation time is fixed and the events operate
independently and at a constant rate over time. In hockey, penalties can be called at all
moments of a game, and the per-period length among both our populations is 20 min-
utes. A Pearson χ2 test for over- or underdispersion can identify whether a data set
appears to be drawn from a Poisson distribution, and is used with our penalties per
period information. 
A generalized linear mixed effects model for Poisson data (McCulloch & Neuhaus,
2001) is used for four dependent variables, second and third period penalties in both
the regular season and the postseason. For periods showing over- or underdispersion,
the variance parameter of the Poisson fit is adjusted using a quasi-likelihood fit
(Wedderburn, 1974). In all models, we use random intercepts for each referee pairing
to account for the fact that the same set of referees preside over multiple NHL games
Table 1: Mean (SE) Penalties per Period
2nd period 3rd period
Postseason Regular Postseason Regular 
season season
Team Home 1.44 (0.05) 1.44 (0.05) 1.27 (0.05) 1.17 (0.05)
Away 1.70 (0.05) 1.52 (0.05) 1.42 (0.05) 1.29 (0.05)
Penalty Fewer penalties 1.80 (0.06) 1.71 (0.06) 1.44 (0.05) 1.31 (0.05)
differential Even penalties 1.63 (0.06) 1.35 (0.06) 1.26 (0.07) 1.07 (0.07)
at start of More penalties 1.46 (0.06) 1.37 (0.06) 1.30 (0.06) 1.19 (0.06)
period
Goal Down 3+ goals 2.43 (0.32) 1.64 (0.27) 1.99 (0.18) 1.54 (0.15)
differential Down 2 goals 1.57 (0.11) 1.36 (0.12) 1.54 (0.12) 1.18 (0.11)
at start of Down 1 goal 1.59 (0.07) 1.44 (0.08) 1.20 (0.08) 1.20 (0.08)
period Tied 1.53 (0.06) 1.49 (0.06) 1.07 (0.06) 1.04 (0.07)
Ahead 1 goal 1.70 (0.07) 1.40 (0.08) 1.26 (0.07) 1.29 (0.07)
Ahead 2 goals 1.60 (0.13) 1.68 (0.12) 1.53 (0.10) 1.09 (0.09)
Ahead 3+ goals 2.20 (0.27) 1.88 (0.21) 1.73 (0.14) 1.48 (0.14)
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together. With 147 unique referee pairs in our data, and because we are not interested
in the specific behavior of individual referees, this term is not considered as a fixed
effect.
Results
Penalty Calls by Period
Mean 2nd and 3rd period penalties per team are shown in Table 1. In postseason
games, teams with a higher number of first period penalties finished the second peri-
od with fewer penalties nearly twice as often as the team with fewer first period penal-
ties (46% vs. 26%, with the remaining 28% an equal number of 2nd period penalties).
This difference is larger for the home team (50% vs. 21%), teams participating in the
Stanley Cup Finals (51% vs. 20%), and teams participating in postseason Game 7
(58% vs. 5%). 
Teams with more first period penalties in regular season games also finished the sec-
ond period with fewer penalties more often than their opponents (43% vs. 29%). This
difference was slightly higher in the games reaching our 95% attendance cutoff (48%
vs. 25%). 
Figure 1 shows the effect of an unequal end of first-period penalty differential on
mean second period penalties per team. The strongest effect is shown in postseason
Game 7s, where teams whistled for more first period penalties receive an average of
0.75 fewer second period penalties.
The ratios of the mean and variance of second period penalties in the postseason
and regular season are 0.86 and 0.77, respectively, suggesting Poisson models be
adjusted for underdispersion using a quasi-likelihood fit. The ratio of the mean and
the variances of third period penalties are 1.09 and 1.02, close enough to 1, as judged
by a lack of significance in the Pearson test for dispersion, to fit using a traditional like-
Figure 1: Mean second period penalties by first period penalty differential, game type
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lihood approach. The random intercept for referee pairing is significant in all models,
as judged by a likelihood ratio test.
Effect estimates from our mixed effect models of second and third period penalty
counts, from the postseason and regular season groups, are shown in Tables 2-5 along-
side their standard errors. First period penalty differential is a significant predictor for
both home (rate ratio 0.94, 95% CI 0.90 - 0.98) and away (Rate Ratio 0.91, 95% CI
0.87 - 0.94) second period postseason penalties (Table 2). In a Poisson regression with
explanatory variable X, a rate ratio is estimated by eβ, where β is the coefficient on X.
In this case, X represents the first period penalty differential, and our estimate suggests
that for each increase of 1 in the end of first period penalty differential between a
home team and its opponent, that team will be whistled for 6% fewer second period
penalties. The effect estimate for series round (Stanley Cup Finals vs. other) is border-
line significant (p<0.10), suggesting referees may call fewer penalties when stakes are
increased. 
Table 3 presents shows estimates from our fit of third period postseason penalties.
Teams with more cumulative penalties than their opponents entering the third period
of postseason games are called for fewer infractions than their opponents, with this
effect slightly stronger for home teams (RR 0.95, 95% CI 0.92-0.99) than away teams
(RR 0.97, 95% CI 0.93-1.01). Effect estimates for the absolute goal differential terms
Table 2: Estimates (SE) from Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of log(2nd Period
Penalties) from Postseason Games
Model
Overall Home teams Away teams 
(n = 1198) (n = 599) (n =599 )
Intercept 0.974  (0.100)** 0.879  (0.142)** 0.921  (0.130)**
Penalty differential  -0.075  (0.014)** -0.062  (0.022)** -0.097  (0.020)**
after P1
Ahead (yes vs. no) 0.009  (0.051) 0.014  (0.078) 0.004  (0.071)
Score differential 0.059  (0.054) 0.057  (0.084) 0.054  (0.072)
(1 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.062  (0.070) -0.009  (0.107) 0.138  (0.093)
(2 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.362  (0.092)** 0.247  (0.143)* 0.461  (0.120)*
(3+ vs. tied) after P1
Cup finals (yes vs. no) -0.172  (0.092)* -0.225  (0.133)* -0.112  (0.116)
Game 7 (yes vs. no) -0.183  (0.112) -0.332  (0.180)* -0.064  (0.139)
Home team (yes vs. no) -0.121  (0.040)** NA NA
Note: All models include random effects for referee pairing and adjustments for team
and opponent. Score differential represents  the absolute value of the difference in the
score between the two teams  at the beginning of the period, with a tie game used as
the reference category.
** p < 0.01
*   p < 0.10
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Table 3: Estimates (SE) from Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of log(3rd Period
Penalties) from Postseason Games
Model
Overall Home teams Away teams 
(n = 1198) (n = 599) (n =599 )
Intercept 0.630  (0.130)** 0.405  (0.178)** 0.686  (0.175)**
Penalty differential -0.041  (0.013)** -0.053  (0.019)** -0.032  (0.019)*
after P2
Ahead (yes vs. no) -0.051  (0.056) -0.043  (0.079) -0.022  (0.082)
Score differential 0.123  (0.071)* 0.203  (0.102)* 0.099  (0.101)
(1 vs. tied) after P2
Score differential 0.347  (0.079)** 0.350  (0.114)** 0.369  (0.110)**
(2 vs. tied) after P2
Score differential 0.528  (0.080)** 0.554  (0.116)** 0.545  (0.111)**
(3+ vs. tied) after P2
Cup finals (yes vs. no) -0.140  (0.113) -0.277  (0.157)* -0.035  (0.151)
Game 7 (yes vs. no) -0.161  (0.132) -0.074  (0.183) -0.205  (0.191)
Home team (yes vs. no) -0.135  (0.050)** NA NA
Note: All models include random effects for referee pairing and adjustments for team
and opponent.
**  p < 0.01
*    p < 0.10
Table 4: Estimates (SE) from Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of log(2nd Period
Penalties) from Regular Season Games
Model
Overall Home teams Away teams 
(n = 900) (n = 450 ) (n = 450 )
Intercept 0.426  (0.059)** 0.269  (0.190) 0.600 (0.200)**
Penalty differential after P1-0.075  (0.018)** -0.092  (0.026)** -0.060  (0.031)*
Ahead (yes vs. no) -0.077  (0.051) -0.075  (0.073) -0.053  (0.089)
Score differential -0.049  (0.056) -0.046  (0.081) -0.059  (0.084)
(1 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.020  (0.073) 0.029  (0.106) -0.028  (0.118)
(2 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.172  (0.104)* -0.003  (0.164) 0.298  (0.153)*
(3+ vs. tied) after P1
Attendance > 95% 0.037  (0.052) 0.122  (0.101) -0.023  (0.084)
Home team (Yes vs. No) -0.055  (0.049) NA NA
Note: All models include random effects for referee pairing and adjustments for team
and opponent.
**  p < 0.01
*    p < 0.10
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are large and statistically significant, suggesting games entering the period with a larg-
er absolute score differential result in a significantly higher number of penalties than
games tied at the beginning of the period. This is consistent with prior research indi-
cating that fouls of aggression are more common when the opportunity cost of win-
ning the match is lower (Jewell, 2009).
Tables 4 and 5 show model estimates for regular season second and third period
penalties, respectively. First period penalty differential is a strong predictor of second
period penalties for the home team (RR 0.91, 95% CI 0.87 – 0.96) and a moderate pre-
dictor for the away team (RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.88 – 1.00). For third period regular sea-
son penalties, a larger penalty differential at the beginning of the period results in a
significantly fewer number of calls on the home team (RR 0.95, 95% CI 0.91-0.99) but
not for the away team (RR 0.99, 95% CI 0.95-1.04). 
In all models, a fixed effect for whether or not the team is playing with the lead
entering the period is not a significant predictor, and regular season penalty counts are
not noticeably affected by whether or not the game reached the 95% attendance cut-
off.
Control Checks
Most penalties are called as a result of a player being put in a defensive position; there-
fore, different proxies for aggressive behavior were attempted to control for changes in
player behavior. One proxy we considered was shots on goal. Aggressive teams may
register more offensive possessions and draw more penalties. However, these same
teams may receive more penalties in the act of acquiring the puck to begin with, thus
Table 5: Estimates (SE) from Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of log(3nd Period
Penalties) from  Regular Season Games
Model
Overall Home teams Away teams 
(n = 900) (n = 450 ) (n = 450 )
Intercept -0.008  (0.174) -0.220  (0.233) 0.094  (0.260)
Penalty differential -0.035  (0.015)* -0.053  (0.020)** -0.010  (0.023)
after P2
Ahead (yes vs. no) 0.006  (0.063) 0.104  (0.092) -0.041  (0.17)
Score differential 0.151  (0.088)* 0.054  (0.122) 0.243  (0.131)
(1 vs. tied) after P2
Score differential 0.044  (0.098) -0.035  (0.139) 0.081  (0.141)
(2 vs. tied) after P2
Score differential 0.357  (0.098)** 0.309  (0.139)* 0.370  (0.149)*
(3+ vs. tied) after P2
Attendance > 95% -0.035  (0.066) -0.040  (0.109) 0.007  (0.098)
Home team (yes vs. no) -0.099  (0.057)* NA NA
Note: All models include random effects for referee pairing and adjustments for team
and opponent.
**  p < 0.01
*    p < 0.10
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negating the likelihood of gaining and advantage through more time on offense.
Inclusion of shots per period failed to improve our models or modify the effect of
penalty differential, suggesting that an attacking offense does not correlate strongly
with penalty outcomes.
While player behaviors do change throughout the game, the most likely changes are
tactical in nature. Losing teams may adjust which lines receive more ice time and allow
more ice time for strong offensive players. However, this is likely counterbalanced by
the leading team’s tactical shift of issuing more ice time to strong defenders who are
less likely to commit a penalty. This change in tactics, seen through player behavior,
reduces the risk that the results are due to player, rather than referee, behaviors. These
findings are consistent with prior research on aggression and NHL referee actions
(Heckelman & Yates, 2003).
One potential issue with our design is that players and teams may use a less aggres-
sive style of play if they have already received a larger number of penalty calls. In soc-
cer and basketball, for example, league rules enforce additional penalties to repeat
in-game offenders and their teams that might force competitors to adjust their style of
play. However, other than the penalty itself, hockey rules do not place additional pun-
ishment on players or teams for higher frequencies of penalty calls, except in the rare
case that a player receives multiple game misconduct penalties for severe infractions.
As a result, because they are allowed to continue aggressive behavior throughout the
contest, it seems plausible that hockey players are less likely to adjust their aggressive-
ness compared to athletes in other sports. In our data, the weak correlation between
one team’s first and second period penalties (-0.03 for postseason, -0.05 for regular
season), and a team’s cumulative first and second period penalties with their third
period penalties (0.00 for postseason, 0.03 for regular season) suggest that team’s do
not noticeably change their aggressiveness relative to previous infractions. 
While Buraimo et al. (2009) used relative goal differential as a predictor of soccer
infractions using in-game data, absolute goal differential was used in our models. As
shown in Table 1, there does not appear to be a consistent growth of penalty frequen-
cy by relative goal differential. In fact, penalty counts appear to vary only with respect
to how far the score deviates from a tie game at the beginning of the period. To check
this claim, we estimated all of our models using relative goal differential and compared
these fits to the ones provided in Tables 2-5 using the Akaike Information Criterion
statistic. Inclusion of absolute goal differential, instead of relative goal differential,
yielded roughly equivalent or much stronger fit statistics in our models.
Prior research has also suggested that large markets or popular teams may receive
preferential treatment by officials (Price et al., 2012). To account for this, we examined
the difference in penalty distribution based on presence in hockey’s “Original Six,”
which includes the teams from Boston, Toronto, Chicago, Montreal, Detroit, and the
New York Rangers. Inclusion of this variable did not result in a significant improve-
ment to the model.
Finally, to assess a possible association between regular and postseason penalty
behavior, we examined the correlation between regular and postseason penalty rank,
judged by the ranking of postseason qualifiers in penalties per game. No strong posi-
tive correlations between the rankings were found, and in some years, negative corre-
lations were found, suggesting style of play is dictated by mostly by opponents and
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game strategies that change for the playoffs. In total, these control checks provide some
assurance that other factors, such as player behaviors, have not unduly influenced the
results.
Discussion
Our findings make several key contributions within the literature on referee behaviors.
First, by removing the assumption that referees are continually biased towards home
teams, we find that the penalty frequency is determined by penalty differential and
score of the game. Second, this model recognizes the psychological desire for fairness
inherent in the role of a referee. The model incorporates how bias is implemented and
situational factors where one team is more likely to receive a power play. Third, this
model is built upon the recognition that referees play a significant role in preserving
the integrity of a sporting league, along with the associated financial returns. Finally,
this research builds on the work of Buraimo et al. (2009) and Price et al. (2012) by
illustrating how officials institute bias in a different sport. Our model demonstrates
how and when preferences for fairness as equality are implemented into the sport of
hockey. In total, these contributions better our understanding of the human element
involved in refereeing. 
The hypothesis of make-up calls among NHL referees is enhanced by looking at
penalty calls in postseason overtime. In professional hockey, games ending regulation
in a tie move to the sudden death format, in which the game ends after the first goal is
scored. In 25 of the 134 postseason overtime games since 2006, at least two total penal-
ties were called. In 19 of the contests with multiple penalties (76%), the second power
play was awarded to the team that was called for the first penalty. We would expect the
second power play to be awarded to the opposite team 50% of the time. However, this
sample proportion is significantly different from 0.5, as judged using a 1-sample z-test
for proportions (p <0.01). Thus, in the most intense moments of the most important
games, the tendency for a reversal of penalties appears to be the strongest.
In our data set, for both regular and postseason and in both second and third peri-
ods, teams with more penalties entering the period were called for fewer infractions.
The effect of penalty differential was relatively similar comparing regular and postsea-
son play, with stronger effects evident for the home team. Our findings complement
the recent work of Mongeon and Mittelhammer (2011), which used continuous flow
to suggest that referees use make-up calls to keep games close in the regular season.
While play-by-play data may reveal within-period changes in behavior, discretizing by
period offers the advantage in that at the end of each period, team personnel is most-
ly reset. As a result, a reversal in a penalty call is less likely to be effected by the changes
in on-ice personnel that occur with each result of a power play. 
To consider the possibility that the effect of penalty differential is modified by one
of our other fixed effects, we also tested the significance of two-way interaction terms
between each fixed effect and penalty differential entering the period. The only two
marginally significant interaction terms linked Game 7 status with penalty differential
for second period postseason data (Table 6), and games reaching our attendance cut-
off with penalty differential in our second period regular season model (Table 7).
Combined with Figure 1, the estimates in Table 7 provide moderate evidence that the
effect of prior penalty differential is largest when games are played in front of larger
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crowds. While we used a binary cutoff of 95% attendance to indicate games that were
more highly attended, the p-value for our interaction term between penalty differen-
tial and our attendance variable was at least moderately significant (p < 0.10) using all
integer cutoffs between 90 and 99%. 
While this analysis is able to illustrate situations where one team is more likely to be
called for a penalty, the impact on the overall outcome of the game is mostly undeter-
mined. In our sample, we looked at the effect of prior penalty differential on the like-
lihood of each team winning the game. Because teams with more penalties earlier in
games are receiving more power play opportunities later in games, it is plausible that
such teams are more likely to win these contests. This extends the work of Widmeyer
and Birch (1984) by providing a rationale for their observation that aggressive teams
early in games are more likely to win. 
Among postseason games tied at the end of the first period, the team with more first
period penalties was significantly more likely to win the contest (OR 1.20, 95% CI,
1.07-1.33) than the team with fewer first period penalties. In postseason games tied
after the second period, we found moderate evidence that the team with higher cumu-
lative first and second period penalties was more likely to win the game (OR 1.13, 95%
Table 6: Estimates (SE) from Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of log(2nd Period
Penalties) from Postseason Games, Including Interaction Term
Model
Overall Home teams Away teams 
(n = 1198) (n = 599) (n =599 )
Intercept 0.979  (0.100)** 0.879  (0.142)** 0.953  (0.131)**
Penalty differential  -0.070  (0.015)** -0.062  (0.022)** -0.097  (0.020)**
after P1
Ahead (yes vs. no) 0.009  (0.051) 0.014  (0.078) 0.010  (0.071)
Score differential 0.058  (0.054) 0.057  (0.084) 0.044  (0.072)
(1 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.062  (0.070) -0.009  (0.107) 0.130  (0.093)
(2 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.361  (0.092)** 0.247  (0.143)* 0.451  (0.120)**
(3+ vs. tied) after P1
Cup Finals (yes vs. no) -0.169  (0.092)* -0.225  (0.133)* -0.099  (0.116)
Game 7 (yes vs. no) -0.210  (0.112)* -0.331  (0.181)* -0.113  (0.145)
Home team (yes vs. no) -0.120  (0.040)** NA NA
Penalty differential -0.139  (0.082)* 0.007 (0.140) -0.241 (0.106)*
after P1*game7
Note: All models include random effects for referee pairing and adjustments for team
and opponent. Score differential represents  the absolute value of the difference in the
score between the two teams  at the beginning of the period, with a tie game used as
the reference category.
**  p < 0.01
*    p < 0.10
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CI 1.00-1.28). No significant evidence of an increased likelihood of winning existed in
regular season games for either period. 
Conclusion
Our analysis identifies how referees may issue “even-up” calls over the course of a
professional hockey game to achieve perceptions of balance and fairness. In-game
analysis finds significant evidence that referees exhibit a form of “biased impartiality”
when a team has a negative penalty differential, and there is support that this effect is
strongest in games when the referees are under the most pressure. Results also suggest
this tendency may be stronger for the home team. 
However, there are a number of limitations to the model of officiating. In using only
hockey in the sample, the same types of behaviors may not be found in other sports or
other industries. The linkage between game situation and referee behavior may not be
as prevalent in other settings. Idiosyncratic characteristics unique to hockey may also
fail to carry over to other samples. Additionally, the data in this study is limited based
on categorization by period, rather than as a continuous flow during the game. Further
research that tracks penalty calls by time rather than period may provide further illu-
mination into the actions of referees. Finally, all infractions (roughing, boarding,
interference, etc.) were counted the same in this analysis. Referees may penalize specif-
ic behaviors with greater regularity when attempting to even up calls. Research into
Table 7: Estimates (SE) from Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of log(2nd Period
Penalties) from Regular Season Games, Including Interaction Term
Model
Overall Home teams Away teams 
(n = 900) (n = 450) (n = 450 )
Intercept 0.409  (0.147)** 0.278  (0.202) 0.441 (0.210)*
Penalty differential -0.021  (0.030) -0.025  (0.046) 0.026  (0.038)*
after P1
Ahead (yes vs. no) -0.078  (0.052) -0.077  (0.073) -0.057 (0.089)
Score differential -0.055  (0.057) -0.070  (0.082) -0.046  (0.083)
(1 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.003  (0.074) 0.018  (0.106) -0.031  (0.113)
(2 vs. tied) after P1
Score differential 0.149  (0.106) -0.051  (0.166) 0.327  (0.156)*
(3+ vs. tied) after P1
Attendance > 95% 0.036  (0.056) 0.134  (0.102) -0.035  (0.084)
Home team (yes vs. no) -0.062  (0.050) NA NA
Penalty differential after -0.089 (0.037)* -0.104 (0.056)* -0.130 (0.052)*
P1* attendance > 95%
Note: All models include random effects for referee pairing and adjustments for team,
season, and opponent.
**  p < 0.01
*    p < 0.10
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these details may provide additional enlightenment into how referees achieve their
biased impartiality.
Beyond the additions mentioned above, future studies building on this work are
numerous. Exploring other sports or professions could provide new insight into areas
of biased impartiality. While this study only consists of games, a longitudinal study of
the NHL could map different changes in league and referee incentives towards devel-
oping the game on and off the ice. Extensions of this study may also include how con-
sumers respond to changes in refereeing behavior.
In conclusion, the model derived from this research illustrates how NHL referees
even up penalty calls to increase perceptions of fairness. The effect of these calls is to
balance scoring opportunities and ultimately, the number of games won or lost by
each team. This study is unique in its approach of examining how bias may evolve
through the course of a game. In contrast to studies concerned with only the final out-
come, this isolation of bias effect provides greater insight into referee behaviors and
motivations. Although long debated by spectators, players, and coaches, empirical evi-
dence supports the idea that referees even up penalty calls in the spirit of equal oppor-
tunity and financial incentive.
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